| About Organization
for Internet Safety |
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What companies are
members of OIS? |
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The current members are: @stake,
BindView, Caldera International (The SCO Group), Foundstone,
Guardent, ISS, Microsoft, NAI, Oracle, SGI, and Symantec. We're
actively soliciting software vendors and security research companies
to join. |
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Why was the OIS
formed? |
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OIS was formed to make it easier
for security researchers and vendors to work together to fix
security vulnerabilities. Today, there are no agreed-upon processes
for handling security vulnerabilities. Every vendor has different
expectations about how security researchers should report newly
discovered vulnerabilities, the amount and type of information they
should provide, and so forth. Likewise, every security researcher
has different expectations about how often a vendor should
provide status on ongoing investigations, give credit to the finder,
and so forth. The lack of any consensus procedures complicates the
process of fixing vulnerabilities, and ultimately increases the risk
that all computer users face. OIS was formed as a unique partnership
between leading security researchers and vendors, for the purpose of
proposing such processes. |
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Can individual
researchers join OIS? |
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OIS is currently made up of
companies or organizations. We originally excluded individual
researchers on the basis of maintaining equity between the
representation of research and vendor communities. Recently,
however, we have been reconsidering that decision, though no new
decision has been reached. Since the OIS launched, we have been
overwhelmed by requests for membership and are deliberating on the
best way to address the outpouring of interest. Participation in the
mission of the OIS, developing and promulgating guidelines for
handling vulnerability information, does not require membership,
however. All interested parties will be strongly encouraged to
participate in the review and comment process once the draft
guidelines are released. |
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How will OIS ensure
that the processes actually meet the needs of the
security community? |
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OIS recognizes that the processes
will only be adopted if they represent the consensus of the security
community. As a result, OIS is committed to public review and
comment on all proposed processes. |
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Why does OIS think
anyone will adopt the processes it develops? |
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It's our shared experience that
the vast majority of security professionals and vendors want to
handle security vulnerabilities in a way that minimizes the risk
they pose. We believe that if we help provide a tool that lets them
do this more effectively, they'll use it. |
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Does the OIS plan to
make these processes mandatory in some way? |
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Absolutely not. These are best
practices, not laws, and people will always be able to choose
whether to use them or not. |
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Does OIS support a
federal law codifying the disclosure process? |
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No. We believe the industry should
self-regulate and are attempting to move along the process of
self-regulation. |
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Is OIS affiliated
with any national governments? |
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No. Although many governments are
concerned about the need to protect critical infrastructures, and
support private industry efforts that hold the promise of doing this
more effectively, OIS is entirely a private enterprise conceived and
executed by the member companies. |
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I heard that OIS was
just a smokescreen by which vendors plan to hide their security
vulnerabilities. Is this true? |
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No. Clearly, any process that put
demands on security researchers but not on vendors wouldn't be
adopted by the security community. The processes the OIS is
developing will apply to both vendors and researchers, and require
commitments from both. The goal is to make all of our processes
consistent, transparent, and effective. |
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Does OIS support
pre-disclosure of vulnerability information to select groups? |
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No. We believe the software author
should be given a chance to create a fix before vulnerability
information is made public, but that there should be no
further distribution of that information until the fix is complete.
This priniciple can be very difficult to adhere to in certain
situations, such as dealing with the open source community where
there aren't protections to keep vulnerability information secret. |
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Does OIS exchange
non-public vulnerability information amongst its
membership? |
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No. The OIS Code of Conduct
prohibits the distribution of vulnerability information to anyone
other than the discoverer and the software author. |
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What does OIS think
about the auctioning or selling of non-public vulnerability
information? |
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We believe that it is unethical to
intentionally make one person more vulnerable than another.
Pre-release communities distribute the information too broadly for
it to be kept secret. Once the word is out to some, the risk of
exploit increases dramatically, but many people still don't know
about the problem. While we have no illusions about the possibility
of the vulnerability being known outside the vendor and researcher,
we prefer not to add to that problem. |
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Will the processes
be industry standards? |
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It's difficult to say at this
point. Because the processes we're developing are human processes,
rather than technical specifications, it's not clear whether they'll
be eligible to be adopted by an industry standards body. We're still
investigating the best way to publish and host them. |
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Why did the IETF
reject the Responsible Disclosure Internet Draft as a standard? |
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The IETF did not think of itself
as the proper venue for a non-technical procedural standard. |
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What's the advisory
board? |
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The member companies want to
ensure that we're representing the interests of computer users, and
to do that we've asked some of the leading security voices to help
us do this by joining our advisory board. The board is still being
formed, but we hope to include among its members recognized security
experts as well as representatives from companies that operate some
of the world's largest networks and therefore have a keen sense for
security issues. |
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What is the OIS code
of conduct? How does it relate to the responsible disclosure
policies and procedures that OIS is creating? |
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The code of conduct outlines some
of the fundamental issues of responsible disclosure that the members
of OIS agree upon. It is likely that its spirit will be embodied in
more detailed policies and procedures that OIS is working on. OIS
encourages vendors and researchers to adopt a similar code of
conduct. |
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OIS's code of
conduct prohibits publishing "proof of concept" code. How are
customers going to be able to know that the fixes are working? How
are IDS vendors going to create a signature for the vulnerability? |
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While those examples are ethical
and legal uses for "proof of concept" code, there are unfortunately
very dangerous and illegal uses for that code, such as the easy
creation of malicious tools and worms. OIS is concerned about
Internet safety as a whole. It may be true that a small number of
sophisticated administrators can make beneficial use of "proof of
concept" code, but its publication puts the vast number of internet
users at serious risk. |
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Why all this effort
on standardizing disclosure? Why not just build the software more
securely in the first place? Where are the secure software
standards? |
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The vendors and security companies
that are part of OIS heartily agree that software needs to be built
more securely in the first place. Efforts are underway at many
vendors to improve the security of their products when they ship.
Many of the security companies work with software developers to help
them design and test their products for security before they are
delivered to customers. |
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